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Tactical Authenticity in the Production of Autoethnographic Mad Narratives 
Abstract 
First-person accounts of madness and of encountering psychiatric services provide important 
sociocultural and psychological knowledge about the subjectivity of distress. The importance 
of such accounts is often based upon a claim of the authenticity of personal experience. 
However, authenticity is a highly heterogeneous concept: a popular current manifestation of 
the discourse of authenticity is in positive psychology, where it is often underpinned by 
humanist assumptions such as the rational autonomous self. The post-structuralist critique of 
humanism challenged such essentialist notions some time ago and has been adopted explicitly 
by research methodologies such as autoethnography. The purpose of this article is to argue 
that this tension - between the value of methods such as autoethnography that offer a 
legitimate source of knowledge regarding the subjective experience of madness on the one 
hand, and the problems with an essentialist conception of the ‘authentic’ self on the other - 
can be addressed by the deployment of a reconceptualised form of authenticity based on 
Gayatri Spivak’s (1988) notion of ‘strategic essentialism’, especially when modified by 
Michel De Certeau’s (1984) distinction between ‘tactics’ and ‘strategies’. The implications of 
this distinction in terms of developing autoethnographies of distress is then discussed.  
 
Key words: authenticity; madness; autoethnography; narratives; positive psychology; mental 
health. 
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Introduction 
R. D. Laing wrote in the preface to The Divided Self that he wanted to “make madness, and 
the process of going mad, comprehensible” (Laing, 1960, p. 9). The problem, Laing argued, 
was that the categories used by biological psychiatry often bear little relationship to the actual 
experience of patients. Thus, by presenting madness in purely reductionist biological 
language, our understanding of what it is like to go mad becomes entirely mystified. Although 
Laing did not have direct experience of madness himself when he wrote The Divided Self, the 
purpose of making madness comprehensible to those without first-person experience has 
arguably been a key driver behind the growth in psychiatric ‘illness memoirs’, 
‘autopathographies’ and ‘patient narratives’ of psychiatric experiences. Such accounts provide 
an important source of knowledge about the experiences of madness from the ‘inside’ 
(Woods, 2012). There are several well-known narratives that have influenced the 
development of clinical theory and practice (Schreber, 1903; Greenberg, 1964; Saks, 2007), 
along with a plethora of lesser known works used in medical training programmes (see 
Hornstein, 2008). Such accounts “have a vital role to play in our comprehending, mapping, 
and negotiating of madness” (Baker et al, 2010, p. 2). 
More recently, the emancipatory potential of first-person accounts of madness has 
been recognised in terms of offering “new ways of understanding mental distress and of 
working with people to identify new ways of living with or overcoming distress and providing 
services” (Faulkner, 2017, p 509). This ‘experiential knowledge’, Faulkner (2017) argues, 
“has a significant contribution to make where some of the basic premises of professional 
knowledge are strongly contested” (p. 509).  
First-person accounts thus afford something important and unique that performs two 
distinct, but at times related, functions: to provide information and insight into an often 
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ineffable and mysterious experience; and to challenge the very paradigm of bio-medical 
psychiatry itself from the perspectives of those who use, or have used, services. More 
recently, the methodology of autoethnography has emerged that often blends these two aims 
together in mental health research. We would argue, and this article will try to show, that such 
attempts are often predicated on an argument of authenticity.  
Yet authenticity, precisely as a term with extensive cultural capital, is hardly neutral or 
homogenous, relating as it does to a whole range of practices, values and concepts in public 
life (Vannini and Williams, 2009). It is also a term that is laden with considerable conceptual 
baggage (Ferrara, 2009), to the point that some writers have dispensed with it completely, 
whilst also trying to establish the value of first-person accounts on an entirely separate basis 
(e.g., Grant et al, 2013). In our opinion, these latter attempts have not been very successful, as 
we will argue more fully below.    
In what follows therefore, we wish to outline a theory of authenticity that we believe 
may support the valorisation of first-person accounts of knowledge in mental health 
autoethnographies without falling into several persistent traps. In doing so, we will be making 
the following claims: 
1. Authenticity is a heterogeneous concept, but one which encompasses a series 
of values and practices that do cohere; 
2. Homogenising the concept of authenticity, conversely, opens the door to 
methodological difficulties and dubious practices and affiliations; 
3. Attempts to support first-person knowledge claims inevitably centre on some 
implicit variation of what we will call ‘the argument from authenticity’, even 
when they explicitly deny it; 
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4. A modified concept of authenticity can be a viable basis to support first-person 
knowledge claims in a non-essentialist way – we will call this approach 
‘tactical authenticity’. 
 We will begin by locating the concept of authenticity in terms of its linguistic, 
historical and conceptual background. To indicate some of the traps associated with it, we will 
then show how the recent positive psychology movement has re-appropriated the concept of 
authenticity in service of a neo-positivist and neo-liberal agenda. We will then explore how 
the poststructuralist critique of humanism has already complicated the idea of authenticity. In 
the final section, we develop from these debates the notion of a tactical concept of 
authenticity which, we argue, may be politically useful in both asserting, and deploying in 
transformational ways, the value of autoethnographic accounts of madness. 
Before proceeding however, we would like to clarify our chosen terminology. We 
have deliberately opted to use the term ‘madness’ for the specific purposes of this article. 
Although controversial, this term is preferable, in this context, to the narrow medical 
symptomology represented by other clinical definitions such as ‘mental illness’ or ‘psychiatric 
disorders’ (Baker et al, 2010). ‘Madness’ encompasses the broader social, psychological and 
cultural dimensions which are often the ones that matter most to the subjects experiencing 
mental distress (Burstow, 2015). With the emergence of sub-disciplines such as ‘Mad Studies’ 
and political movements focussed on the emancipation of service-users from stultifying 
institutional discourses (Starkman, 2015), the choice of ‘madness’ already reflects the 
strategic approach to discourse we will be arguing for. 
 We also recognise that various terms have been used to describe the recipients of 
mental health service treatment, including ‘patient’, ‘service-user’, ‘consumer’, ‘client’ and 
‘survivor’ (Beresford, 2007). In recognition of this, we have therefore decided to use both 
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‘service user’ and ‘survivor’ interchangeably here to refer to people experiencing or who have 
experienced madness or distress within a mental health institutional context.  
 
Authenticity: Linguistic and Cultural Roots 
Unsurprisingly, the origins of the word ‘authenticity’ are complex and diverse. It first 
appeared in English from the mid-14th Century onwards when it had the sense of ‘authorised’, 
‘authenticated’ or ‘recognised by legitimate authorities’ (for example, the acceptance of new 
doctrine by the Church authorities). It was borrowed from the Old French word 
autentique, which had the related meaning of ‘canonical’, as in, entitled to be included in the 
cannon of sacred knowledge. The French autentique derived in turn from the Medieval Latin 
term authenticus, which itself was directly derived from the Greek term authentikos, meaning 
‘original, genuine, principal’. The root of authentikos is authentes, which combines autos 
(‘self’) and hentes (‘doer, being’) to mean - in contrast to its later relation to external 
authorities such as the church - ‘acting on one’s own authority’. This Greek word, 
hentes, comes in turn from the Proto-Indo-European word sene, meaning to ‘accomplish’ or 
‘achieve’, implying an action that produces recognition. Indeed, some interpreters also cite the 
Greek word authenteo which means to have ‘full power over’ to the extent of ‘usurping 
another’ or even ‘committing a murder’ (Trilling, 1972).  
 Therefore, there is a tension at the heart of our conception of authenticity: between 
authenticity defined as ‘accurate representation of a reality’ and authenticity defined as 
‘recognition or authority’. Arguably, our own era privileges the former definition; for 
example, the Oxford English Dictionary currently defines authenticity as being “in 
accordance with fact, as being true in substance”. Given these diverse etymological roots, it is 
no surprise that modern usage beyond the dictionary definition is equally diverse. ‘Authentic’ 
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can mean ‘real’ in the sense of not a copy (e.g., an ‘authentic’ or verified Van Gogh painting, 
with a corresponding market value); or it can denote the subjective fidelity of an artistic 
representation (e.g., Wilfred Owen’s poetry presents ‘authentic’ depictions of the experiences 
of war); or it can be used to describe the integrity of a person or behaviour (e.g., Donald 
Trump is an ‘authentic politician’ in that he ‘tells it like it is’ etc.). In terms of personality 
descriptors, we generally describe someone as authentic in terms of their genuineness, 
forthrightness, honesty and congruence. One could still understand authenticity through the 
ancient Greek rhetorical theory of ethos: it is what gives truth-value to someone’s speech or 
discourse because of the integrity and relevant experience of the speaker. It is not just that the 
content of the speech is factually true, but that the one who speaks is especially - perhaps even 
uniquely - entitled to speak on this topic by dint of their personal experience. 
 
Authenticity and Existentialism 
Whilst the term and the meanings it conveys have undeniable social currency, authenticity is 
more than just a cultural value or useful social heuristic: it has also enjoyed status as a 
recurring concept in philosophical discourse. As a fully formulated intellectual understanding 
of the world, modern academic concepts of authenticity derived largely from the work of 
continental philosophy in the 1930s through to the 1950s, particularly Martin Heidegger and 
Jean Paul Sartre (Kaufmann, 1975). Both explicitly used the term ‘authenticity’ in their work 
and were influenced by the works of Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, who also 
foregrounded issues of individual subjectivity and personal agency (Medlock, 2012).  
Early Heidegger formulated his version of authenticity, in the second section of 
Division Two of Being and Time (1998), according to the neologism eigentlichkeit, which 
names the attitude in which one engages in projects as one’s own (eigen). Heidegger was 
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playing on the ordinary German term ‘eigentlich’, meaning ‘truly’, which has the root ‘eigen’ 
meaning ‘own’ or ‘proper to’. Adding ‘keit’ to eigentlich turns it into a transitive project, an 
unfolding which also implies a process of ‘owning’ or ‘propering’. Therefore, for Heidegger, 
authenticity involves taking ownership of one’s unfolding life in terms of one’s relation to a 
trans-individual Being. This would be in contrast to the majority of people who are content 
with a form of inauthentic ‘thrownness’ into the everydayness of ‘the-they’ which alienates 
them from Being.  
For Sartre (1948), relatedly, authenticity consists in avoiding the ‘bad faith’ that 
comes from denying the inescapable tensions between choice and circumstance. The authentic 
person here is the one who makes genuine existential choices but also takes responsibility for 
their consequences, despite the horror or disgust they may feel towards the ultimate 
meaninglessness of the universe (Kaufmann, 1975). Where Heidegger tends to think of 
authenticity as an alignment with Being such that the Cartesian cogito is left behind, Sartre’s 
existentialist humanism grounds authenticity in a cogito that knows it is “condemned to be 
free”: after the death of God, the only authentic position is to refuse to let oneself off the hook 
with merely inherited worldly moralities, and instead confront the ethical stakes in every one 
of our choices and actions. If Heidegger’s authenticity implies a participation in the epochal 
Being of a world, Sartre’s authenticity invokes an isolated individual defying worldly 
conventions - so much so that in his Being and Nothingness the prisoner is presented as a 
paragon of authentic freedom. 
Heidegger and Sartre’s work was subjected to sustained criticism on both ethical and 
philosophical grounds. Adorno (2003), in particular, developed a Marxist critique that 
characterised Heidegger’s ‘jargon of authenticity’ as an ahistorical form of obscurantism that 
promises the ‘unconcealment of Being’ but in fact “gives itself over either to the market, to 
balderdash, or the prevailing vulgarity” (2003, pg. xix): in other words, Heidegger’s notion of 
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authenticity served ideological purposes, obscuring real historical contradictions. According 
to Adorno then, the jargon of authenticity could ultimately be used to legitimise both the 
bureaucratic tyranny of Nazism and the exploitative language of advertising in late 
Capitalism. If Adorno has a contrasting notion of ‘authenticity’, it is a negative authenticity 
that confronts the non-identity at work in identity (1973). Regarding Sartre, Jacques Derrida 
(1972) pointed out that he never quite dispensed with the notion of a Cartesian self that makes 
choices, and analyses those choices, somehow outside of the constraints of societal context or 
language. For Derrida, Sartre’s project of an existential humanism for the era following the 
death of God was thus “nothing other than the metaphysical unity of man and God, the 
relation of man to God, the project of becoming God as the project of constituting human-
reality”, so much so that “Atheism changes nothing in this fundamental structure” (Derrida, 
1972, p. 116). Sartrean existentialist authenticity for Derrida would smack of onto-theology 
and metaphysics.  
 As these philosophical debates illustrate, the tensions within authenticity between the 
representation of an essential reality on the one hand, and questions of authority and 
ownership on the other, are played out in relation to fundamental philosophical questions such 
as the very nature of thought. They also show how the notion of authenticity is tied up with 
concepts of individual subjectivity and (non)identity. As the next section will show, these 
tensions become even more marked in humanist and positive psychology.   
 
Authenticity and Positive Psychology 
Although existentialism was beginning to decline in influence in Europe around the 1960s, 
several of its main theoretical tenets were to be revived, albeit in a culturally idiosyncratic 
way, in American humanist psychology. Carl Roger’s articulation of the ‘actualising 
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principle’ at the centre of human striving owed much to Kierkegaard, whilst Abraham 
Maslow’s famous ‘hierarchy of needs’ and ‘peak experiences’ similarly borrowed from 
Nietzsche (Medlock, 2012). Of course, the profoundly disturbing, even deconstructive, nature 
of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s thought is noticeably absent from Rogers and Maslow; there, 
the individual is conceived of in terms of ‘positive striving’ and the drive to ‘congruence’ 
rather than in terms of their relation to sin (Kierkegaard) or power (Nietzsche).  
 If American humanism seemed to borrow from an existentialist language shorn of its 
more pessimistic and challenging elements, then this probably represented something of the 
culture of both the United States and the growing discipline of psychology. The spectre of the 
essentialist Cartesian self, indirectly present in Sartre’s thought, is very much in the 
foreground in empirical psychology (Parker, 2007). It is little surprise then that the concept of 
authenticity would experience something of a revival through a marriage between American 
humanism and empirical psychology in the new sub-discipline of positive psychology.  
According to its proponents, positive psychology is “the scientific and applied 
approach to uncovering people’s strengths and promoting their positive functioning” (Snyder 
and Lopez, 2006, p. 3). Distancing themselves from what they perceived to be mainstream 
psychology’s preoccupation with the ‘negative’ aspects of human pathology, positive 
psychology instead focusses upon the ‘positive’ aspects of human nature, conceived by 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) as positive subjective experiences, positive individual 
traits, and civic virtues. These ‘civic virtues’ are tied to Classical character traits such as 
wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance and transcendence, all formulated according 
to the basic assumptions of positive psychology: that there is a human “nature”; that action 
proceeds from character; and that character comes in two forms, both equally fundamental - 
bad character and good virtuous character (Seligman, 2002a, p. 125). Seligman (2002b) 
summarises the positive psychology perspective on human functioning thus: “When well-
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being comes from engaging our strengths and virtues, our lives are imbued with authenticity” 
(p. 14). 
If the assumptions underlying positive psychology seem somewhat simplistic, this is 
probably due in part to a tendency in psychology to formulate concepts that can be easily 
subjected to quantitative evaluation (Parker, 2007). A more recent trend in the growing 
conceptual amalgamation between humanist and positive psychology is the rise of empirical 
measurement of key humanist concepts (Joseph, 2015). On this basis, the concept of 
authenticity has been developed from Rogers’ (1961) notion of congruence and investigated 
as an ‘individual difference variable’ leading to formulations of the ‘authentic personality’ 
(Wood et al, 2008). In this ‘new’ approach to authenticity, authentic living can be understood 
as “being true to oneself in most situations and living in accordance with one’s values and 
beliefs” (Wood et al, 2008, p. 386), with psychopathology becoming the degree to which “the 
person experiences self-alienation between conscious awareness and actual experience (the 
true self)” (p. 386). Finally, “the extent to which one accepts the influence of other people” 
along with “the belief that one has to conform to the expectations of others” (p. 382) marks 
the degree to which one is able to ‘resist external authority’ – the third component in Wood et 
al’s (2008) tripartite conception of authenticity. This ‘authentic personality’ has then been 
measured in a number of ways familiar to empirical psychology: questionnaires, laboratory 
experiments and mood reporting via digital technology (Lenton, Bruder et al, 2013; Lenton, 
Slabu et al, 2013; Davis et al, 2015). 
  Empirical psychology literature has tended to look at associations between 
authenticity and popular positive psychology concepts such as ‘wellness’, ‘flourishing’ or 
‘flow’ and this probably reflects the tacit assumption that authenticity can be used as a 
benchmark for other positive psychology concepts such as ‘wellbeing’ and ‘self-actualisation’ 
(Joseph, 2015). This approach has some rather obvious limitations. It is entirely possible that 
  13 
white supremacists in the United States, for example, could experience ‘congruence’ between 
their actual experience of hating black people and their values of ethnic purity, whilst also 
resisting the external authority of Liberal political consensus through hate rallies and armed 
militias, but we have yet to come across a positive psychology study that has looked at 
authenticity and flourishing amongst the alt-right. This example may be extreme perhaps, but 
it does illustrate the tendency amongst some psychologists to assume their concepts are 
‘objective’ and thus apolitical (Parker, 2007), whilst simultaneously employing standards of 
measurement and theoretical constructs that are tied very closely to political practices that are 
far from neutral or benign (e.g., Wright, 2013; Wright, 2014; Davies, 2016; Cederström and 
Spicer, 2009). 
There are further theoretical and methodological shortcomings in authenticity research 
within the narrow disciplinary confines of psychology. For instance, people who are 
‘inauthentic’ are, by definition, highly unlikely to be aware of their supposed inauthenticity 
and hence highly unlikely to reflect this quality in the type of measurements used by 
psychologists. The difficulty appears to reside in how the complexity of identity, and the 
varied manifestations of selfhood in everyday life, may alter considerably according to 
different contexts and the different roles people occupy in these contexts (Ferrara, 2009). This 
leads however to the paradox of an inauthentic study of authenticity, one which ultimately 
relies on a binary notion of self that is built upon a true/false dichotomy often taken for 
granted by authenticity researchers. Psychologists have reprised the essentialist nature and 
meaning of a ‘core self’ (Parker, 2007), but this is especially true of a core self that is tied to 
the much narrower idea of living according to a pre-set criterion of ‘strengths’ and ‘virtues’.  
 
Autoethnography and Authenticity 
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These complexities have led some psychological authenticity researchers to conclude that the 
best way of studying authenticity may be across a whole lifespan using autobiographical life-
story narratives (Harter, 2005). Here, at least some form of developmental continuity in 
behaviour can be established beyond the immediate context of the psychological survey or 
experiment. As Harter (2005) elaborates: 
[N]arrative construction is a continuous process as we not only 
craft but also revise the story of our lives, creating blueprints 
that facilitate architectural development of the self. In so doing, 
one’s life story can also emerge as a true story (p. 391). 
 In other words, the complexity of narrative construction and reconstruction, along with 
its relationship with the ongoing process of revision, mean that the ‘truth’ of the story (i.e., its 
‘authenticity’) can emerge in the process of telling. Is the future for the study of authenticity 
therefore to be found in narrative approaches, and not in empirical psychology?  
In many ways, the place at which Harter arrives above probably represents more 
continuity with the concept’s phenomenological and existential origins - i.e., narrative as self-
making or autopoiesis as opposed, ultimately, to market research methods – which is probably 
why much of the research from the humanist stable tends to be qualitative (Joseph, 2015). 
Yet, narrative research has its own narrative of authenticity concerning its legitimacy and this 
is particularly the case with narrative research that comes under the general heading of 
‘autoethnography’. It is to these approaches that we will turn now. 
Frustrated by research that failed to recognise the invisible and unacknowledged, yet 
very real, presence of the researcher (Ellis and Bochner, 2000), alongside disillusionment with 
what was perceived to be the increasingly sequestered and elitist position of academic 
discourse, autoethnography sought to recapture something of the vitality of ‘lived experience’ 
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in the research enterprise, with the researcher’s own experience becoming the primary ‘data’ 
(Bochner, 2001). “I become a detached spectator” write Ellis and Bochner (2006) about 
traditional methods, “I become only a head, cut off from my body and emotions. There’s no 
personal story to engage me” (p. 481).    
In contrast, autoethnography focussed on lived experienced which prioritised both the 
stories of the researcher and researched, but also the first-person perspective as an important 
way of writing academic research (Ellis, 2004). This move was predicated on what Grant et 
al. (2013) depicted as “a shift from a single, monolithic conception of what should constitute 
scholarly work in favour of a developing pluralism” (p. 3). As Art Bochner (2001), a 
prominent autoethnographic researcher, argues, narratives “have a major role to play in the ill 
person’s quest for authenticity, a journey he or she may never reach but cannot resist.” (p. 
147). 
In these terms, and at first glance, narrative approaches would seem to provide an 
ideal basis for an empirical study of human life and subjectivity, both in terms of developing 
knowledge but also in terms of an ethical imperative to honour the experience of those being 
researched. The argument deployed here, against the perceived hegemony of academia and 
for the restoration of the first-person perspective, was one of authenticity. However, such 
‘arguments from authenticity’ are not without issues, as we will show in the next section. 
 
Issues with Autoethnography 
Unfortunately, many autoethnographic approaches fall prey to a set of problems that also 
underlie the empirical positive psychology approaches – namely, the assumptions surrounding 
the self, particularly the true/false binary, or even the notion that there is such thing as a ‘true’ 
self to begin with, outside of the way in which the ‘self’ is performed in a particular social 
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context. Paul Atkinson (2009) developed a scathing critique of narrative research which 
contends that “narratives are treated as proxies for the direct apprehension of subjective, 
personal experience” (S1.3) and are thus “treated as sources of authenticity, grounded in the 
biographical particularities of speaking subjects” (2.11). One of the issues Atkinson highlights 
is the notion of supposed narrative exemplarity, which ultimately results in a reductionism 
that leads to “the equation of the social with the personal” (2.14) whereby personal 
expression, via the first-person perspective only, takes the place of systematic and rigorous 
social analysis. Atkinson (2012) refers to such approaches as ‘sentimental realism’ whereby 
“the narrating speaker is celebrated as an atomised subject” (2.14) with an emotional truth to 
convey. 
Given these problems, it is no surprise that some autoethnographers dispense with the 
concept of authenticity entirely. For example, Grant et al. (2013) call for “the poststructural 
narrating voice of the emergent ‘I’” over the “narrative voice of the predetermined I” (p. 8) in 
order to “show how subjectivity is produced rather than to display a privileged and secure, 
transcendent narrative identity position” (ibid p.8). They also favour privileging of the 
distinctive voice, including the use of irony, humour, mockery, silence and textual disruption 
of the singular voice. 
However, such an enterprise still leads Grant et al. (2013) to try to establish validity 
for narrative research against the criticisms of positivism. There is an important dilemma 
here: how can narrative research be legitimised when the main argument for its validity has 
resided in an argument for authenticity? It appears to be something of a contradiction when 
Grant et al. (2013) repudiate the role of authenticity so fully in their chapter because of its 
humanist assumptions of presence, and then assert that:  
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Arguably, academic-, discipline- and profession-based practice 
based on personal knowledge and experience is more credible, 
ethical, imbued with integrity, empathic and potentially 
effective. This marks the difference between implicational and 
propositional knowledge: between knowing, feeling, connecting 
and doing, from the heart, based on personal experience, rather 
than solely on the basis of rationally acquired information. (p. 
11). 
Although Grant et al. (2013) have succinctly summarised why autoethnography is 
such an important methodology, theirs is still an ‘argument from authenticity’ that 
surreptitiously employs the same categories used by earlier, humanist researchers. Of course, 
it is possible that Grant et al’s (2013) arguments are based on an overly-simplistic reading of 
Derrida (1976), maintaining, as they do, some of the binaries of presence (e.g., 
feeling/intellect, implicational/propositional etc.) that Derrida was at pains to deconstruct in 
his work, but the question remains: if we attempt to abandon notions of authenticity on the 
basis that they re-inscribe humanist notions of presence, on what basis can we still emphasise 
the strategic importance of autoethnography? 
 
Tactical Authenticity and Autoethnographic Mad Narratives 
The psychiatric survivor and mental health researcher who wants to employ autoethnographic 
methods when voicing their experience could well be caught in a peculiar double-bind. On the 
one hand, the values of such approaches may lie in challenging stigma whilst also providing 
the opportunity to educate professionals, lay people and students as to the actual conditions 
and experiences of people who use services (Russo, 2016). On the other hand, there is a risk 
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of falling into unhelpful binary oppositions when invoking concepts such as ‘voice’ or ‘lived 
experience’ (Voronka, 2016) that risk creating a different set of problems. 
 The postcolonial theorist, Gayatri Spivak (1990), recognised a similar dilemma in the 
position she often found herself occupying as a ‘spokesperson’ for ‘subaltern’ Indian women 
in the United States, but it was a dilemma she attempted to turn to advantage: 
But it is not possible, within discourse, to escape essentializing 
somewhere. The moment of essentialism or essentialization is 
irreducible. In deconstructive critical practice, you have to be 
aware that you are going to essentialize anyway. So then 
strategically, you can look at essentialisms, not as descriptions 
of the way things are, but as something that one must adopt to 
produce a critique of anything. (p. 51) 
In other words, the essentialist categories of ‘Indian’ and ‘woman’ may indeed be 
problematic, but they do provide the (‘Indian’, ‘woman’) speaker with a certain degree of 
legitimisation in the mainstream discourse, a place from which to speak and from which some 
form of resistance and challenge can be mobilised. As Spivak (1988) elaborates, “it is within 
the framework of a strategic interest in the self-alienating displacing move of and by a 
consciousness of collectivity, then, that self-determination and an unalienated self-
consciousness can be broached” (p. 14). Could the same approach work for autoethnographic 
mad narratives, that is, legitimisation of the survivor’s ‘voice’ based upon this ‘strategic’ 
version of authenticity? 
Whilst this approach may be superficially attractive, there are at least three problems 
when applied to madness narratives. Firstly, madness is an inherently deconstructive 
experience; when speaking or writing about such experiences there can be “a disjunction 
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between the content to be narrated and the possibilities inhering in conventional narrative 
forms” (Stone, 2004, p. 18). Secondly, madness is not a homogenous experience; some 
experiences may be constructed differently in different contexts (e.g., religious voice hearers 
in church and voice-hearing psychiatric patients in hospital) and so-called ‘mad identity’ 
incorporates a vast range of conditions, experiences and treatments (Miller, 2017). It is thus 
difficult to essentialise an experience as heterogeneous as extreme psychological distress, 
when the conditions for some experiences (e.g., eating disorders) are bound to differ 
significantly from others (e.g., psychosis). As Miller (2017) observes, “the experience of 
psychiatric oppression in its various forms is presumably an important commonality, but there 
seems no reason to presume any further unanimity” (p. 17).  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it is questionable whether intervening through 
essentialising experiential or identity categories actually works. Sometimes, the place you are 
given to speak from is simultaneously a major constraint on what you can say, or be heard as 
saying. Indeed, Spivak eventually rejected the concept of strategic essentialism herself 
precisely because “my notion just simply became the union ticket for essentialism” (Danius et 
al, 1993, p. 35): in other words, it led to the very essentialist tendencies she was seeking to 
avoid in the first place. In the field of mental health, where differences between experiences 
are even less likely to be anchored to singular identity categories due to the heterogeneous 
nature of ‘distress’, “using experience and identity as a commodity to gain entry into systems 
of power”, as Voronka (2016) observed when laying claim to authenticity in experience, can 
result in “entrenching and naturalizing difference” (p. 199).  
When discussing her eventual rejection of the concept of strategic essentialism, Spivak 
added a further important qualifying observation: “As to what is meant by strategy, no one 
wondered about that” (Danius et al, 1993, p. 35). This raises an important question regarding 
the limitations of ‘strategy’ itself that may provide a clue as to why her project was 
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unsuccessful. A possible solution, we would argue, might be found in the work of Michel De 
Certeau, specifically in his distinction between ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’. De Certeau (1984) 
calls ‘strategy’ “the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes 
possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific 
institution) can be isolated” (p. 35-6). Strategy is thus an essentially military term, having to 
do with territories and the top-down imposition of forms of rationality and practice that exert 
an ongoing control. By contrast, De Certeau defines ‘tactics’ as “a calculated action 
determined by the absence of a proper locus” (p. 37), that is, without a territory of its own, 
which also occurs in a different temporality, one that seizes the opportune moment (what the 
ancient Greeks called Kairos) that appears within the metronymic regularity of rationalised 
time (Chronos). If strategy is determined by those with power, tactics are the operations used 
by those with little power who nevertheless find ways to subvert and adapt strategies to suit 
their own ends. 
Tactics are thus adaptations to environments or territories that are shaped by strategy 
but move in opposition to it, against its grain. For example, town planners might determine 
the streets of a city with expectations of how people will use them, but those who know the 
environment, the ‘users’, will spontaneously adapt the routes they take to suit their experience 
(e.g., taxi drivers using shortcuts, or so-called ‘desire lines’ that traverse planned pathways). 
In this way, “strategy is transformed into tactics” (p. 37) within its very terrain. De Certeau’s 
work thus identifies, within institutionalised forms of power, an immanent possibility of 
subversion which is not reducible to the forms of representation through which such power 
works, and yet necessarily accompanies them.  
One could also define the relationship between psychiatry and the service-
user/survivor movement in a similar way: although psychiatry as a discipline maintains a 
presence through its strategies of place (hospitals and university faculties), observation 
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(measurement technologies) and bodies of knowledge (classification systems), service-user 
movements have nevertheless been able to gain a foothold within these institutions and move, 
precisely, across them somewhat obliquely. An example of this tactical appropriation of 
strategy can be seen in neo-liberal policies of patient engagement, which do give patients an 
institutional space in which to speak, at least in the UK where service-user representation in 
the National Health Service has in fact become mandatory (Rose, 2015), and thus to speak 
‘against the grain’. Illustrating this, Rose et al (2003) have shown that when participants were 
interviewed about their experience of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) by service-user 
researchers rather than by professional researchers or clinicians, ‘satisfaction’ turned out to be 
significantly lower than had been found previously, thereby challenging the asserted 
legitimacy of ECT (Rose, 2008). In this instance, the tactics based upon contextualised, 
experiential knowledge which were then employed using the language of strategy (i.e., 
‘evidence-based practice’ and ultimately ‘customer feedback’), were able to subvert the 
knowledge claims of the dominant strategic form of power, resulting in concrete changes to 
policy in terms of how ECT was administered. As Rose (2008) later elaborated, “We 
intervene on the terrain drawn by psychiatry and try to re-shape its priorities in a user-focused 
direction” (p. 642). This example shows that tactical interventions can occupy the same 
terrain as the strategies that make up these fields, but precisely by displacing the identity-
categories that we believe are part of the problem. 
Autoethnographic mad narratives may offer a similar tactic in terms of intervening 
into the discourses of psychiatry via the discourse of authenticity. As Charles Taylor (1991) 
recognised, “the moral force of the ideal of authenticity” (p. 17) is still “one of the 
constitutive ideals of modern culture” (p. 18). Similarly, the liberal representational stance of 
Western culture (i.e., ‘I respect your experience and I’m listening to what you have to say 
about it’) provides opportunities for autoethnographic mad narratives to occupy a space 
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within psychiatric research and practice, but in order to tactically disrupt it, rather as 
occupations are an important tactic among activists.  
Such approaches might therefore lay claim (or, indeed, re-claim) the original meaning 
of the term ‘authenticity’ which emphasises the importance of gaining recognition, and 
establishing authority for one’s experience, precisely there where the ‘owness’ of experience 
is put into radical question. In autoethnographic madness narratives, such tactics might take 
the form of using the ‘official’ discourse of psychiatry (e.g., clinical notes) presented 
alongside thick descriptions of the experiences of survivors and carers (e.g., Clarke, 2018) in 
order to show how the everyday experience of a psychiatric patient is transformed into a 
discourse that serves strategic power. Another approach might juxtapose fragmented personal 
accounts with theoretical analysis and reflections on method in a ‘layered account’ of 
psychological distress (Rambo, 2013) without imposing the ‘panoptical’ view of any 
particular ‘voice’. Finally, another approach might present multiple viewpoints in order to 
force discussion on the very controversial issue of suicide (Webb, 2010). Taken together, 
these works point the way forward to possibilities of employing personal experience in a 
tactical way whilst taking into account Spivak’s point, a propos of Derrida, that the metaphor 
of ‘voice’ itself carries the danger of essentialising ‘representationalism’ (Landry and 
Maclean, 1992). As opposed to its strategic counterpart, tactical authenticity, we would argue, 
makes it possible to give voice to the radical heterogeneity and singularity of the experience 
of madness.  
 
Conclusion 
This article explored the concept of authenticity related to mad narratives in the research 
method of autoethnography. Despite varied etymological and cultural roots, authenticity has 
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been used to mean primarily ‘real’ as in ‘not a copy’ or, less commonly, to mean pertaining to 
‘authorship’ or ‘authority’. These tensions have been reflected in philosophical debates 
concerning identity and subjectivity and have found expression more problematically in 
recent empirical positive psychology research. Some researchers have attempted to reclaim 
the notion of authenticity, principally through the methodology of autoethnography, but these 
attempts often result in a deployment of the same categories (often surreptitiously) that affect 
positive psychology. Although these issues are confronted through Gayatri Spivak’s notion of 
‘strategic essentialism’, a possible solution was proposed in Michel De Certeau’s distinction 
between ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’. The article concluded by providing potential examples of 
tactical authenticity in autoethnographic mad narratives.       
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